Based on kernel version 3.9. Page generated on 2013-05-02 23:15 EST.
1 VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O"[1] 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Many modern system now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities 4 to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been 5 allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d, 6 POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC 7 systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device 8 agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in 9 a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows 10 safe[2], non-privileged, userspace drivers. 11 12 Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device 13 access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible 14 I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply 15 turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of 16 significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of 17 bare-metal device drivers[3]. 18 19 Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing 20 field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from 21 userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based) 22 and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either 23 go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream 24 driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework, 25 which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support, 26 and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration 27 space. 28 29 The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the 30 KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more 31 secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO. 32 33 Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs 34 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35 36 Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically 37 create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts, 38 and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is 39 by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment 40 as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the 41 greatest risk to the overall system integrity. 42 43 To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate 44 isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only 45 meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices 46 with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated 47 from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing 48 things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines. 49 50 This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device 51 though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices, 52 interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation. 53 For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi- 54 function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish 55 between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require 56 transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this 57 could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors 58 between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable 59 bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology 60 can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI 61 bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if 62 from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor 63 as well. 64 65 Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level 66 granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The 67 IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is 68 a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the 69 system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO. 70 71 While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to 72 ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred 73 granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be 74 possible to share a set of page tables between different groups, 75 reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing, 76 reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only 77 a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of 78 a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container 79 is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device. 80 81 On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all 82 but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away. 83 The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level 84 of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the 85 group associated with the desired device. This can be done using 86 the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the 87 device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new 88 VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where 89 $GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member. 90 If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to 91 be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group 92 are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from 93 host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the 94 group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface 95 for disabling driver probing/locking a device. 96 97 Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening 98 the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the 99 VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the 100 previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver 101 supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may 102 be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container 103 with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used 104 instead. 105 106 With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining 107 ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces. 108 Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each 109 device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor. 110 111 The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O 112 regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as 113 well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt 114 notifications. 115 116 VFIO Usage Example 117 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 119 Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0 120 121 $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group 122 ../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26 123 124 This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the 125 pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the 126 group: 127 128 # modprobe vfio-pci 129 130 Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group 131 character devices for this group: 132 133 $ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0 134 06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08) 135 # echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind 136 # echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id 137 138 Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free 139 it for use by VFIO: 140 141 $ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices 142 total 0 143 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 -> 144 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0 145 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 -> 146 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0 147 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 -> 148 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1 149 150 This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge[4], therefore we also 151 need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same 152 procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does 153 not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to 154 bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently 155 support PCI bridges). 156 157 The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if 158 unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides 159 no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to 160 mode 0666 by the system). 161 162 # chown user:user /dev/vfio/26 163 164 The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this 165 group and can access them as follows: 166 167 int container, group, device, i; 168 struct vfio_group_status group_status = 169 { .argsz = sizeof(group_status) }; 170 struct vfio_iommu_x86_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) }; 171 struct vfio_iommu_x86_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) }; 172 struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) }; 173 174 /* Create a new container */ 175 container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio, O_RDWR); 176 177 if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION) 178 /* Unknown API version */ 179 180 if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_X86_IOMMU)) 181 /* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */ 182 183 /* Open the group */ 184 group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR); 185 186 /* Test the group is viable and available */ 187 ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status); 188 189 if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE)) 190 /* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */ 191 192 /* Add the group to the container */ 193 ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container); 194 195 /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */ 196 ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_X86_IOMMU) 197 198 /* Get addition IOMMU info */ 199 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info); 200 201 /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */ 202 dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 203 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); 204 dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024; 205 dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */ 206 dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE; 207 208 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map); 209 210 /* Get a file descriptor for the device */ 211 device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0"); 212 213 /* Test and setup the device */ 214 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info); 215 216 for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) { 217 struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) }; 218 219 reg.index = i; 220 221 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, ®); 222 223 /* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps 224 * For PCI devices, config space is a region */ 225 } 226 227 for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) { 228 struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) }; 229 230 irq.index = i; 231 232 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, ®); 233 234 /* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */ 235 } 236 237 /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */ 238 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET); 239 240 VFIO User API 241 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 242 243 Please see include/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation. 244 245 VFIO bus driver API 246 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 247 248 VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces 249 into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver, 250 the driver should call vfio_add_group_dev() and vfio_del_group_dev() 251 respectively: 252 253 extern int vfio_add_group_dev(struct iommu_group *iommu_group, 254 struct device *dev, 255 const struct vfio_device_ops *ops, 256 void *device_data); 257 258 extern void *vfio_del_group_dev(struct device *dev); 259 260 vfio_add_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the 261 specified iommu_group and register the specified dev as owned by 262 a VFIO bus driver. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks 263 similar to a file operations structure: 264 265 struct vfio_device_ops { 266 int (*open)(void *device_data); 267 void (*release)(void *device_data); 268 ssize_t (*read)(void *device_data, char __user *buf, 269 size_t count, loff_t *ppos); 270 ssize_t (*write)(void *device_data, const char __user *buf, 271 size_t size, loff_t *ppos); 272 long (*ioctl)(void *device_data, unsigned int cmd, 273 unsigned long arg); 274 int (*mmap)(void *device_data, struct vm_area_struct *vma); 275 }; 276 277 Each function is passed the device_data that was originally registered 278 in the vfio_add_group_dev() call above. This allows the bus driver 279 an easy place to store its opaque, private data. The open/release 280 callbacks are issued when a new file descriptor is created for a 281 device (via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD). The ioctl interface provides 282 a direct pass through for VFIO_DEVICE_* ioctls. The read/write/mmap 283 interfaces implement the device region access defined by the device's 284 own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl. 285 286 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 287 288 [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its 289 initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since 290 outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy. 291 292 [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's 293 possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between 294 functions and even for single function devices to have alternative 295 access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To 296 guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the 297 IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together 298 (iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should 299 still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the 300 best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for 301 virtualization usage models. 302 303 [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device 304 assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that 305 future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of 306 these trade-offs. 307 308 [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions 309 from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu: 310 311 -[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0 312 \-0d.1 313 314 00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90)